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FIRST DAY

June 29-30, 1964

SECTION ONE

QUESTIONS

1.
Duncan was on trial for the murder of Clark. The
evidence disclosed that Duncan went to Clark's room in a hotel
about 9 o'clock p. m.; that he left in five minutes; and that about
10 o'clock p. m. Clark telephoned the hotel clerk to call an
ambulance to_take him to a hospital. The hotel clerk was then
asked: "What did Clark say, if anything, as to how he was
injured"? If permitted to answer the question, the clerl{ would
have said: "I aslced Mr. Clark what had happened and he said,
'Duncan came to my room and hit me with a blackjack. Get me to
the hospital quiclcly or I may die; it's been an hour since I was
hurt and I am bleeding. ' ''
Is the evidence admissible?

2.
Upon the trial of an action of debt for goods sold,
the plaintiff introduced his bookkeeper as a witness solely to
identify the order given by the defendant for the goods. The
defendant, on cross-examination, asked this witness: "Were these
goods as warranted;i? The plaintiff, by counl?el, objected to the
question on the ground that it was not proper cross-examination.

How ought the Court to rule?

3.
A motion for judgment alleged that Defendant
negligently operated his automobile and thereby struck Plaintiff
and caused him severe personal injuries. Defendant, within the
permitted timeJ filed a paper setting outJ under appropriate
headings, the following:

(1) A demurrer because the particulars of the
negligence were not stated.
(2) A motion for a bill of particulars of the
injuries sustained.
(3) A counterclaim against Plaintiff for $2,500,
balance due on a note.
(4) That the action was barred by a statute of
limitations.
(5) That he denied the charge of negligence.
Plaintiff objected to the paper and moved to strike it out
on the grounds:
That it was multifarious;
That Defendant was not entitled to know the
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particulars of the injuries;
(c) That it was not necessary to set out the
particulars of the negligence;
(d) That the counterclaim could not be asserted in
the pending action; and
(e) That the paper did not specify the particular
statute of limitations relied on.
How ought the Court to rule on each ground?

4 .-- Anderson sued Brown, Carter and Daniel in the Circuit
Court of Clarke County for injuries sustained by Anderson while a
guest passenger in Brown's automobile when it was involved in a
three-way collision with cars operated by Carter and Daniel. Carter,
within the proper time, filed his responsive pleading, denying
liability to Anderson and asserting a claim against Brown and Daniel
for injuries sustained by him (Carter) in the collision.
Anderson, Brown and Daniel all objected to this procedure.
How ought the Court to rule?

5,
James owned an antique desk which Roberts bought from
him for $1, 000, and which Roberts paid, saying: 11 Keep the desk for
me until tomorrow and I will send and get it." Later the same day,
Williams was at the James home, saw the desk, and offered James
$1,500 for it. James accepted the offer, got the money, delivered
the des1c to Williams and left for parts unknown.
Roberts tells you the above facts and he wants you to get
the desk for him, saying Williams had it and claimed to own it.

in what

~~ ~
court

What form of action would you institute?
Assuming both parties are residents of Wythe County,
or courts might the action be brought?
(c) How would it be instituted?

6.
James White of Baltimore, Maryland, purportedly
executed a deed of trust to Henry Brown, Trustee, of Richmond,
Virginia, to secure ratably for John Williams of Richmond, Virginia,
the payment of a note for $18,ooo and for Thomas Hanson of Elkton,
Maryland, the payment of a note for $12,000. The property embraced
in the deed of trust was real estate in Montgomery County, Maryland,
worth $40,000. Default was made in the payment of both notes and
Williams requested the Trustee to sell under the deed of trust.
The Trustee promptly notified White of l:lis intention to foreclose,
and was informed by White that the purported deed of trust was a
forgery and was never executed by him. Brown, as Trustee, then

- 3 brought ari action in the United States District Court in B:tltimore
to effect the foreclosure, joining Williams as a party plaintiff
and White and Hanson as parties defendant. White, by appropriate
pleadings, moved the Court:
To make Hanson a party plaintiff; and
Then to dismiss the action.
How ought the Court to rule on each motion?

7.
charging that
an assault on
bodily injury
and kill him,

An indictment was found against Carl Cranson
he "unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously did make
Thomas Ryan with a certain club, wounding and causing
to said Ryan with intent to maim, disable, dis.figure
the said Ryan. 11

(1) Upon the trial on this indictment, of what
offenses might Cronson be found guilty?
(2) Assume that the jury returned a verdict reading:
"We, the jury, find Carl Cranson guilty of' unlawful wounding and
fix his punishment at confinerr.ent in the State Penitentiary for a
period of three years," and further assume that Cranson made a
timely motion to set aside the verdict because fatally defective;
how ought the Court to rule?
8.
Anxious instituted in the Circuit Court of Surry
County on June 1, 1964, a suit in equity to quiet title to a certain
parcel of land by filing his bill in the clerk's office, to which
were attached numerous documents referred to in the bill as
exhibits. Bestman, Cutter, and Driller, all residents of Surry
County, were named defendants.
Bestman and Cutter were served with process on June 15,

1964, but, after having the process for Driller in hand for twentytwo days, the sheriff made his return that he had been unable to
effect service on Driller.
Bestman feels that he has a valid defense to the suit and·
a valid claim for relief against Anxious in regard to a matter
concerning the property in question and wishes to do whatever is
necessary to establish his claim and, therefore, consults his
attorney on June 26, 1964.
Cutter intends to dispute Anxious' claim and notes that
none of the copies of the bill served on the defendants have copies
of the exhibits attached to them and that these documents are very
rnaterial to the issues and are necessary to have for answering the
bill. Accordingly, Cutter raises the question as to Anxious'
l:ight to proceed wi t11 the suit since no copies of the exhibits were
attached to the copy of the bill served on him, and also, consults
his attorney on June 26, 1964.

(1)

What can and should Anxious do in regard to

- 4 effecting valid service on Driller?
(2) What can and should Bestman do in regard to
asserting (a) his defense to the suit, and (b) his claim for relief
against Anxious?
(3) Is Cutter's contention in regard to Anxious'
failure to attach copies of the exl1ibits valid'?

9.
Attorney Edmunds represented plaintiff in a certain
court action against the defendant, alleging plaintiff was injured
as a result of defendant's negligence, wherein defendant was
represented by Attorney Fuller. A jury trial of the action resulted
in a verdict-on March 3, 1964, for the plaintiff. Defendant's
Attorney Fuller moved to set the verdict aside and enter judgment
for the defendant on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the
law and the evidence, or in the alternative, to grant defendant a
new trial because of errors committed during trial. This motion was
continued and was argued April 1, 1964, and the judge overruled the
motion and entered final judgment for the plaintiff on the same day.
Fuller then requested the court reporter to transcribe the
evidence and though the reporter promised that the transcript would
be ready in fifteen days, he became ill and the transcript of the
evidence was not delivered to Fuller until the morning of May 23,
1964. On the same day, Fuller served written notice on Edmunds
that the transcript was in Fuller's office, available for inspection,
and would be presented to the judge in his chambers on May 29, 1964,
at 10:00 a. m. for certification. It was so presented, but Edmunds
was not present at this time and gave no explanation for his absence.
In spite of Fuller's urging the judge to sign the transcript at the
time, the judge assured him tb.at he would take care of it in at
least two days' time, but became busy and finally certified the
transcript by signing it on June 8, 1964. It was delivered to the
clerk on the same day.
Fuller, believing that the judge would certify the
transcript, had filed with the clerk on May 29, 1964, a notice of
ap~eal and assignments of error, the assignments of error being as
follows:
"(l) The Court erred in entering judgment on the verdict,
as the same Has contrary to the law and the evidence in that
the evidence showed as a matter of law that the defendant was
free from negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
"(2) The Court erred in granting improper instructions
on behalf of che plaintiff and not granting proper instructions
on behalf of the defendant."
(a) Was the certification of the transcript timely and
sufficient?
(b) Were the notice of appeal and assignments of error
timely and sufficient?

- 5 10. By the law of one of the States of the Union (herein
referred to as State X), a corpora~ion is forbidden to hold an
interest in land not actually used for corporate purposes. By the
law of another State of the Union (herein referred to as State Y),
a corporation may hold for any purpose land valued at less than
$1,000,000, but may.not for any purpose hold land of a greater value.
Blue Sky, Incorporated, a corporation of State X, but domesticated
in State Y, holds land in State Y valued at $600,000, and uses this
land for the purposes for which it is chartered, The corporation
has an opportunity to buy additional land in State Y valued at
$250,000. The directors of the corporation consult you as to the
right of the corporation to make tl:le purchase, advising that the
corporation cannot use this land in the performance of its
corporate purposes, but they are confident that it can hold the
property for three or four years and then sell it at a substantial
profit.
How would you advise the directors?

* * * * * * *
* *
*
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* * * * * * *
* *
*
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SECTION TWO

QUESTIONS
1.
Al Able, trading as Able Electric Company, operated
an electrical contracting and sales agency business withhlmself in
active overall charge, his son-in-law as general manager and salesman and employing four men as mechanics and maintenance men. Able
was interested in selling a special type of refrigerator to Ben
Bella, resta~rateur. In an attempt to make the sale it was agreed
that Able would install the unit on trial to see if it would give
adequate service during the restaurant's busy periods over the
succeeding six weeks, sai.d trial to end August 15th. During this
six-week period Cal Cruller, one of Able's employee-mechanics and
maintenance men went to Bella's restaurant on two occasions to
check on the refrigerator unit and to make certain minor adjustments.
Not having heard anything from Bella in regard to the unit, Able
sent Bella a bill for the same on October 1. Bella refused to pay,
saying that he did not want the unit as it had proven to be
unsatisfactory, and Able sued him for the purchase price.
At the trial Bella testified that he told Cruller when he
was at the restaurant the second time, which was two weeks before
the trial period ended, that he didn't want Cruller to service the
unit as he did not want it and was not going to buy it and that
Cruller should give this message to Able. Cruller testified that
he was very busy during that period of time and didn't remember any
such conversation with Bella, although he could not deny the same
and he couldn't say whether or not he communicated any such message
to Able. Able testified that nothing was said to him by anyone.
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant Bella offered
an instruction to the effect that if the jury believed that Bella
had the related conversation with Cruller, then this contituted a
sufficient notification to Able of Bella's intention not to purchase
the unit and the jury should find in favor of the defendant.
Should the court grant this instruction?
2.
Gormand was the owner of a thriving restaurant
business located on premises for which he had a three-year assignable
lease, but because of his age, he had decided he should sell the
business. He entered into a listing agreement dated June 1, 1963,
with Hussell, a real estate agent, whereby Hussell had an exclusive
listing for forty-five days for the sale of the business which
included the name, goodwill, equipment, lease interest, etc., for
$20,000 cash with the commission to Hussell of 7% of the sale price.
Russell contacted a number of people and finally obtained a written
offer from Vintner, dated July 1, 1963, to buy the business for
$5,000 cash and balance in monthly payments secured by chattel
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mortgage, the offer to be binding on Vintner only if he could obtain
an A. B. C. license and a five-year lease on the premises, both of
which had been applied for. This offer was rejected by Gormand as
"not being for $20,000, all cash. 11 Thereafter on July 7, 1963,
another written offer of Vintner's was submitted for $18,000, all
cash, and subject to obtaining A. B. c. license and five-year lease.
This was also rejected by Gormand as "not being for $20,000, all
cash." On July 12, 1963, a tJ.1ird written offer of Vintner's was
submitted stating thac he would buy the business for $20,000 cash
subject only to obtaining A. B. c. license and five-year lease, and
that he hoped to have the license and lease within a very short
while. Gormand made no answer to this, and when conbacted, declined
to sign a contract of sale but would not give any reason for doing so.
On July 30, 1963, Hussell learned much to his distress
that Gormand had sold the business on July 29 to Boyardee, a stranger
to Hussell, for $25,000. Hussell sued Gormand for his commission,
claiming that he had produced a buyer pursuant to the listing agreement, that Gormand had never raised any objection to the provision
as to obtaining an A. B. c. license or lease when rejecting the two
offers prior to the last one, tnat he would give no reason for not
accepting the final $20,000 cash offer, but that the implication was
clear that the reason for refusal was that he had a prospective
buyer at a higher price. Gormand testified at the trial that in
his mind he did not want to tie up his business awaiting Vintner's
obtaining the license or lease, but admitted he had not stated this
in regard to the first two offers and did not give this or any
other reason for rejecting the final offer.
Is Hussell entitled to recover in his action for a
commission against Gormand?

3.
Sam Suburban wanted to leave the teeming city and· buy
a home in the suburbs. He found a wooded area that was being
developed into homesites and was shown various sites by Stu Sellem,
the agent of the owner-developer Tanglewood, Inc. Sellem advised
that an existing lake owned by Tangle Lake, Inc., an entirely
separate corporation, on which some of the sites fronted, was to be
cleaned out and lowered and sand beaches installed and that obviously
these sites would be more desirable than the non-waterfront sites
and therefore would cost more. Sam Suburban had always wanted to
live on the water so he executed a written contract with Tanglewood,
Inc., for the purchase of water front lot number 52, and for the
construction thereon of the dream house model home. The contract
and deed pursuant thereto also provided that the 11 • • • lot 52 is to
be completely sodded and with a forty foot sand beach installed by
Tanglewood, Inc., it being further understood that the lake is to be
cleared out by Tangle Lake, Inc., up to lot 52 and the forty foot
sand beach is not to be installed until the lake is cleaned out and
lowered by Tangle Lake, Inc."
Suburban moved in upon completion of the house but before

- 3 the lake and beach work had been done. After a year's time and
after many protests, this worl{ was still not done. Tanglewood, Inc.,
then advised Suburban that Tangle Lake, Inc., had given Tanglewood,
Inc., every reason to believe that it would clean out and lower the
lalrn, but to the surprise of Tanglewood, Inc., ·chere was not an
enforceable contract for this and Tangle Lake, Inc., had now refused
to do this work. Tllerefore,Ta:nglewood, Inc., advised that it could
not and was not obligated t;o install the beach because the lake had
not been lowered as contemplated by all parties to the contract and
deed.
Suburban brought an action against Tanglewood, Inc., for
damages as represented by the difference in value of his homesite
with and without the clean lake and beach, but Tanglewood, Inc.,
contended that Suburban was not entitled to any recovery because he
did in fact have a water front lot and by his contract knew that the
lake and beach work depended upon Tangle Lake, Inc., doing certain
work first.
Is Tanglewood, Inc., liable to Sam Suburban?

4.
Sandy MacHeath, widower, died possessed of a certain
farm and in his will provided, !'I devise my farm to my daughter
Heather MacHeath, but if she should die without having any children
of her own, then I want it to go to the children of my first-born
son, Angus MacHeath, but to no others except the children of my son,
Angus MacHea th, ii At the time of the mal{ing of the will, Heather
was unmarried, and Angus was married and had one child, Laddie
MacHeath. At the time of Sandy 1 s death, Angus had two children,
Laddie and Paddy, but Heather was still unmarried. Five years subsequent to Sandy 1 s death, Heather, who had been living on the farm,
married Tom MacDougal, and they continued living on the farm
seventeen more years but had no children, and Heather died on June
26, 1964, survived only by her husband, Tom, whom she has named as
her sole beneficiary in her will. During this seventeen-year period,
Angus had two more children, named Harold and Lauder. Angus, Laddie,
Paddy, Harold, and Lauder are all now living.
Laddie and Paddy contend that they have the right to the·
immediate and exclusive possession of the farm.
Harold and Lauder contend that they have the right to
immediate possession along with Laddie and Paddy.
Tom MacDougal contests all their claims.
What estate, interest, or right in the farm, if any, did
Heather MacHeath have; and what estate, interest, or right in the
farm, if any, do Laddie and Paddy MacHeath, Harold and Lauder
MacHeath, and Tom MacDougal have?
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5.
Dowager, a childless widow, owned two large farms
called the "Hill Farm 11 and the 11 valley Farm' 1 and also owned a large
house in town, certain stocks and other intangiblesJ and tangible
personal property of considerable value. In 1955, Dowager executed
a valid will by which she provided in part:
11

To Tom Jones, nephew of my late husband, I leave in fee
simple all that tract of land lmown as the 'Valley Farm 1 and
also my shares of stock, money, and all other intangible
property after payment of charges against my estate. ;i
To Sally Strange, my niece, I leave all the rest and
residue of my property not otherwise disposed of, whether
realty or personalty. 11
11

In 1957, Dowager was adjudged mentally incompetent, and a
committee was appointed to manage her affairs. In 1959, it became
apparent that the two farms were to be taken by the Federal government for a reclamation project, and the committee under court
direction and in a proper suit sold the timber on the ~'Hill Farm 11
for $5,000. The condemnation proceedings against the two farms were
settled in 1960 with approval of the court by payment of $30,000
for the "Valley Farm 11 and $15,000 for the "Hill Farm." Dowager
died in 1961. Tom Jones conceded that Sally Strange was entitled
to the town property and tangible personalty but claimed that he,
Jones, was entitled to the money realized from the sale of the
timber and from the condemnation of the 11 Hill Farm." A suit was
instituted to decide the controversy. It was stipulated at trial
that Dowager was competent at the time of making her will but
incompetent from 1957 to the date of her death.
Who is entitled to the $5,000 timber money and the $15,000
condemnation settlement paid for the "Hill Farm 11 ?

6.
Raymond, a businessman in Suffolk, Virginia, had
finished transacting some business with an acquaintance, Starbuck,
when Starbuck mentioned that he was going to Portsmouth, Virginia,
that day. Raymond asked if Starbuck would do him a favor and take
a draft for $1,000 to the Portsmouth Loan Company and bring back
the money. Starbuck said he would be glad to do it but intended
to do some visiting, etc., and wouldn 1 t be coming bacl-<: from Portsmouth until late at night. Upon receiving this information,
Raymond, not wishing to take a chance of loss of the money by being
brought back late at night, then asked Starbuck to take the draft
to Taylor, another businessman in Suffolk, and ask Taylor to send
the draft by some responsible person. Starbuck took the draft to
Taylor, but Taylor said that he was busy and asked Starbuck to take
the draft to the bus depot and give it to Williams for Williams to
take to Portsmouth. Starbuck went by the bus depot, but Williams
told him he was not going to Portsmouth that day.
Starbuck boarded a bus to Portsmouth and took the draft
and when he arrived in Portsmouth got the money for the draft and
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friends, had several drinks of whiskey but never became intoxicated,
and checked on the money periodically. Starbuck started home in
the early morning hours, sharing a taxi with four strangers. When
he arrived at his room, he discovered that the money was gone, and
he was never able to· find it.
Raymond brought an action against Starbuck for the $1,000.
Is Starbuck liable?

7._

The Green Valley Grain Corporation was engaged, in
Virginia, in the business of processing and selling grains at wholesale and retail. The Company received an order from the Long Horn
Cattle Ranch, in Texas, for 300 barrels of Grade A Hybrid Yellow
Corn, a well-known grade and species of corn. Green Valley Grain
corporation advised Long Horn Cattle Ranch that it could not furnish
the grade of corn it had ordered but that it did have in its possession a bin of Grade B Hybrid Yellow Corn, not exceeding 300 barrels,
which it would sell at $'7.50 per barrel. In response to this advice
the Long Horn Cattle Ranch addressed a letter to Green Valley Grain
Corporation in which it stated:
We desire to purchase, at the price quoted in your letter, the
entire bin of Grade B Hybrid Yellow Corn. After you have
determined the number of barrels of corn in the bin wire or
call us and we shall send our trucks to pick up the corn.u
11

In reply, Green Valley Grain Corporation sent the following telegram
to Long Horn Cattle Ranch:
"Holding bin of corn which you ordered by your last letter.
Will measure at time ofi0;3.ding in your trucks. 11
and, in reply, Long Horn cattle Ranch wired the Grain Corporation:
"Received wire, will pick up corn at your plant Friday, March
20, 1964, II
Thereafter, but prior to March 20, 1964, the storage bins and
contents of Green Valley, without fault on its part, were destroyed
by fire. Green Valley Grain Corporation consults you and inquires
whether it may recover from Long Horn Cattle Ranch the purchase
price of the corn.
How would you advise?

8.
Sam Parks sued Bill Dozer in the Circuit Court of
Goochland County, Virginia, to recover damages for personal injuries
resulting from an automobile collision. At the trial of the case
the evidence established the following facts: The collision of the
automobiles occurred at nighttime; Dozer was operating his car with
his headlights on high beam; no other traffic was approaching from
the direction in which Dozer was traveling; Dozer had been driving
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traveling in the same direction as Dozer, had stopped his car in
Dozer's lane of traffic to talk to a friend of his who was standing
by the roadside and while thus parked he turned on his parking
lights, but due to faulty wiring the taillights on his car were not
burning; Parks' car was black in color and the night was very dark
and there was some fog; for a very brief moment before Parks' car
came within the range of Dozer's headlights, Dozer nodded with sleep
and when he awoke his car was approximately two car lengths behind
Parks' car; Parks' car would have been observable within the range
of Dozer's headlights when the Dozer car was six car lengths behind
parks' car; startled by the sudden appearance of Parks' car in his
lane of tr~ffic, Dozer forcibly applied the brakes of his car which
was then traveling at the lawful speed of 55 miles per hour, but he
was unable to bring his car to a stop before it struck the rear of
Parks' car; Dozer, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have
avoided striking the rear of Parks' car had he, immediately upon
seeing it, cut his car to the left, but because of his alarm and
the brief moment for action he elected to attempt to avoid the
collision by applying his brakes. At the conclusion of the evidence
the Court overruled Dozer's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence,
whereupon Dozer requested the Court to give an instruction on sudden
emergency.
Should the instruction be given?

9.
In the trial of an action for fraud and deceit,
commenced by John Sawyer against Stephen Forester, the following
facts were proved: Sawyer operated a saw mill and was engaged in
the manufacture of lumber; Forester called upon Sawyer at the
latter's home in Roanoke, and offered to sell to him a tract of pine
timber, situate in Stafford County, Virginia; Sawyer told Forester
that he was only interested in malcing purchases of timber tracts
that would produce not less than 3,000,000 board feet of high quality
pine lumber; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, "I have owned this
tract of timber for 10 years, I have been over it many times, and
it is my opinion that this tract of timber will cut 3,250,000 board
feet of beautiful pine lumber, the highest quality"; Sawyer l{new
that Forester had bought and sold timber tracts for more than 20
years and that Forester had been employed for many years by different
lumber companies to cruise timber tracts and to advise them upon
the quality of timber; Sawyer told Forester that he was leaving the
next day for a trip West and that he would not return for 2 months
and because he would not have a chance to examine the timber he was
interested in purchasing it; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer,
11
1 am anxious to sell this tract of timber immediately and I know
is what you want, and I repeat that it is my opinion that you
cannot find better quality pine and I am also of the opinion that
this tract will cut out at least 3,250,000 board feet"; Sawyer then
said to Forester, 11 I know you have had a lot of experience and I
cept your statement regarding the quality and quantity of the
, and I am willing to buy your tract of timber and pay you
sum of $19, 500 11 ; the written contract of sale and purchase,
ter set out, was then signed by the parties; during Sawyer's
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tract of timber and Sawyer learned upon his return the tract produced only 1,000,000 board feet of lumber; unbeY..nown to Sawyer,
Forester had never cruised tlle tirr..ber tract but he believed that
the tract actually did contain 3,250 3 000 board feet of timber; and
plaintiff introduced in evidence the following written contract:
"I, Stephen Forester, do hereby sell to John Sawyer the entire
tract of pine timber, situate on my Pine Top Farm, Stafford
County, Virginia, and John Sawyer does herewith agree to pay
for said tract of timber upon the signing of ti1is contract the
sum of $19,500.
11

Witness the following signatures and seals:

"/s/
"/s/

Stephen Forester
John Sawyer

(Seal)
(Seal)"

After all of the evidence had been introduced defendant
moved to strike plaintiff's evidence and that summary judgment be
for defendant.
How should the Court rule?
10. Jimmy Underpass, 17 years of age, invited Tommy
Childress, 13 years of age, to ride with him on his single-seated
motorcycle. Childress seated himself astride the gas tank, between
the seat and the handlebars, and Underpass occupied the only seat on
the motorcycle. While proceeding along a street in the City of
Lynchburg, Virginia, the motorcycle collided at an intersection with
another vehicle and Childress was seriously injured. A City
Ordinance made it unlawful for the operator of a motorcycle to carry
more persons than there are seats available, and it also made it
unlawful for any person to ride or be transported upon such a vehicle
unless occupying a regular seat. A violation of this ordinance
would result in the imposition of a fine. Childress, by his next
friend, sued Underpass to recover damages for personal injuries.
During the trial of the case defendant requested and the Court gave
an lnstruction telling the jury that Childress was guilty of
negligence per se in violating the ordinance, and if such negligence
constituted---a-contributing proximate cause of the collision plaintiff
couJ.d not recover. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant
and upon a motion to set aside the verdict plaintiff contended that
the Court committed error in instructing the jury that plaintiff's
Violation of the ordinance constituted negligence per se.

How should the Court rule on the motion to set aside the

* * * * * * *
* *
*

